The Modern American
Volume 4
Issue 2 Fall 2008

Article 12

2008

Extending Title VII Protection to Non-GenderConforming Men
Colleen M. Keating

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Keating, Colleen M. “Extending Title VII Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming Men.” The Modern American, Fall 2008, 82-91.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Modern American by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Extending Title VII Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming Men
Keywords

1964 Civil Rights Act, Sex discrimination, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins

This article is available in The Modern American: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol4/iss2/12

EXTENDING TITLE VII PROTECTION TO NON-GENDERCONFORMING MEN
By
Colleen Keating*
When an individual with biologically male genitals takes female
hormones and/or undergoes gender reassignment surgery, she
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits violates the social dictate that she should present herself as a
sex discrimination in employment,1 is generally seen as a meas- person of the gender she was assigned at birth. I. Bennett Caure intended to “remedy the economic deprivation of women” by pers, a professor of law at Hofstra Law School, suggests that gay
placing them “on an equal footing with men” in the workplace.2 men and lesbians, by their very existence, call into question the
of the sexes and their respective accepted
While the overwhelming majority of sexual harassment com- “complementarity”
8
characteristics.
Similarly,
transgender people challenge sociplaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency that enforces Title VII, are brought by ety’s dichotomous concept of gender; they undermine the notion
women,3 men are also victims of sex discrimination in the work- that men and women are opposites of one another and that9 cerplace—especially those who do not present themselves in the tain traits are naturally linked to a person’s biological sex. Caway their coworkers or employers believe a man should. For pers contends that women will continue to face subordination in
as long as the concept of a binary gender system
example, men who wear lipstick and skirts refuse to conform to the workplace
10
exists.
Accordingly,
courts would best further Title VII’s pursocial demands about the way men “ought” to look. Quietness
pose
by
reading
the
statute
as covering a “continuum of genand passivity defy the stereotype that men are generally assertive
11
ders,”
including gay, lesbian, and transand aggressive. Men who have
gender individuals.
sexual relationships with other men
This article surveys a number of
challenge the heterosexist view that
cases and identifies three mechanisms
only male-female sexual relationemployed by courts to deny non-genderships are “natural.” However, federal courts have been reluctant to discrimination against non-gender- conforming individuals’ Title VII claims.
First, the majority of courts fail to distinextend the protections afforded
conforming
individuals
is
sex
disguish between conduct and status. Indiwomen under Title VII to nongender-conforming men.
An crimination grounded in sex stereo- viduals who self-identify or are labeled as
overly narrow conception of sex typing and heterosexist expectations. homosexual or transgender often lose Title
VII claims because courts conflate this
discrimination blinds courts to the
unprotected status with the individuals’
fact that these men are also victims
non-gender-conforming conduct. A secof sex discrimination. And in turn,
ond denial mechanism is closely related.
the denial of protection for nonIn many cases involving homosexual or
gender-conforming men directly
transgender plaintiffs, both sexual orientacontributes to the continued subortion/gender
identity
discrimination
and sex discrimination are at
dination of women.
Many scholars have argued that the plain language of work. The existence of the former, which is not prohibited under
Title VII and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in current Title VII jurisprudence, often obscures the existence of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides a sufficient framework the latter. Finally, courts fail to recognize that sexual orientation
for protecting men who experience discrimination as a result of and gender identity/expression discrimination are actually forms
failing to conform to gender norms.4 Although federal courts of sex discrimination. Homosexual and transgender men and
roles that society asacknowledge that sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimina- women refuse to conform to the gender
12
5
signs,
on
the
basis
of
biological
sex.
This
article argues that
tion, men who do not satisfy social expectations of masculinity
discrimination
against
non-gender-conforming
individuals is sex
have had difficulty succeeding on Title VII claims. Courts often
conflate effeminacy with homosexuality,6 viewing “feminine” discrimination grounded in sex stereotyping and heterosexist
behavior in men as a manifestation of homosexuality (that is, a expectations.
marker for one’s status), rather than recognizing “homosexual”
I. EARLY CASES
as a label that society places on men who engage in non-genderconforming conduct (namely, having sex and/or romantic relationships with other men). Consequently, when faced with a sex
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen and Co.13 was one of the
discrimination claim asserted by an “effeminate” male plaintiff first Title VII cases brought by a transgender individual. The
who is either gay or perceived to be so by his coworkers, courts plaintiff, Ramona Holloway, was born a biological male. After
typically rule against the plaintiff on the ground that Title VII starting female hormone treatments, Holloway informed her emdoes not protect people who are discriminated against on the ployer, Arthur Andersen, that she was preparing to undergo sex
basis of sexual orientation.
reassignment surgery.14 She began wearing lipstick and nail
Courts have also rejected the majority of sex discrimi- polish to work, as well as a feminine hairstyle, clothing, and jewnation claims brought by transgender persons.7 Changing gen- elry.15 A few months later, after she requested that company
ders can be seen as the ultimate form of gender nonconformity. records be changed to reflect her new female name, Holloway
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was fired.16
Holloway’s supervisor explained in an affidavit that
Holloway was terminated because her “dress, appearance, and
manner . . . were such that it was very disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned.”17 This evidence clearly indicated that
Holloway was fired because her employer did not approve of her
non-gender-conforming behavior.18 Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Arthur Andersen had not violated Title
VII by firing Holloway for initiating the process of sex transition.19 The judges stated: “Holloway has not claimed to have
been treated discriminatorily because she is male or female, but
rather because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex .
. . A transsexual individual’s choice to undergo sex change surgery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class,
within the scope of Title VII.”20 The court further reasoned that
the purpose of Title VII was “to remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class” and that Congress had not “shown any
intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its original meaning.”21
Circuit Judge Alfred T. Goodwin dissented, interpreting the plain language of the statute to protect Holloway.22 Although Congress “probably never contemplated that Title VII
would apply to transsexuals,” he argued, Holloway had a legitimate sex discrimination claim.23 Judge Goodwin found that because Holloway was a female on the day she was fired, she was
a member of the class that Congress intended Title VII to protect.24 He argued that the manner in which a plaintiff became a
member of the protected class, whether via birth as a biological
female or through gender reassignment surgery, should not matter for the purpose of a Title VII analysis.25
Even though Judge Goodwin would have allowed Holloway to proceed with her Title VII claim, his analysis of the
case fell short. Because he stressed the fact that Holloway was a
woman and therefore a member of “the disadvantaged class”
that Congress intended Title VII to protect, it is doubtful that he
would have similarly held in favor of a female-to-male transgender plaintiff. Moreover, Arthur Andersen did not discriminate against Holloway because she was a woman. Holloway’s
supervisor suggested that Holloway find a new job where her
transgender identity would be unknown26—indicating that Holloway’s femaleness was problematic only because her employer
was aware that Holloway had been born a biological male and
was uncomfortable with her presenting as a woman.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar
Title VII claim brought by a transgender plaintiff in Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines.27 Karen Ulane, born a biological male, was a
pilot for Eastern Airlines when she began taking female hormones, developed breasts, and underwent sex reassignment surgery.28 She was fired when she attempted to return to work after
her surgery.29 After Ulane sued the airline on a Title VII theory,
the district court reinstated her as a pilot with full seniority, back
pay, and attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit overturned that
ruling, holding that Title VII did not protect transgender people.
The appellate court reasoned that “[a] prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with
a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s
sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which
they were born.”30 The court maintained that if Congress had
intended the statute to “apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex,” then “surely the legislative history would
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”31
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Like Holloway, Ulane suffered discrimination because
she did not conform to gender stereotypes. At the time of these
decisions, courts had not yet recognized that gender stereotyping
is a form of sex discrimination.32 The courts’ analysis in Holloway and Ulane was similar: The plaintiffs were discriminated
against because they were transgender; their status, rather than
their non-gender-conforming conduct, was the basis for the discriminatory treatment. The next step in the analysis was simple:
Transgender individuals are not a protected class under Title
VII, so the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily failed. Under early
Title VII jurisprudence, it would always be legal for employers
to discriminate against transgender employees.

II.THE COURTS’ DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court
broadened its concept of “sex discrimination,” holding that Title
VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
who do not conform to sexual stereotypes.33 The plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, was the only woman among eighty-eight candidates up
for partnership in Price Waterhouse’s Washington, D.C. office
in 1982.34 Hopkins neither made partner nor was rejected; instead, her candidacy was held over for reconsideration.35 When
Hopkins was not nominated for partnership the following year,
she sued the firm under Title VII.
The district court found compelling evidence that Price
Waterhouse’s decision not to offer Hopkins partnership in the
firm was directly tied to her sex. The court noted that “none of
the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major
contracts for the [firm].”36 Partners and clients alike praised
Hopkins’s work, calling her “extremely competent and intelligent,” “strong and forthright, very productive, energetic, and
creative.”37 Many Price Waterhouse partners, however, “reacted
negatively to Hopkins’s personality because she was a
woman.”38 One partner called her “macho,” while another felt
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and a third said
that she needed to take a class at “charm school.”39 Another
male partner explained that if Hopkins wanted to improve her
chances of making partner, she should “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”40
Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that
“Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyping.”41 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holding.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan declared: “We are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”42 The Court ruled that
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions”43 and that
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender.”44
It logically follows from the Price Waterhouse decision
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that an employer who discriminates against a male employee typing. Discrimination against homosexual men is grounded in
based on his refusal to conform to gender norms has violated heterosexist expectations that “real” men should date and have
Title VII. Nevertheless, for years after Price Waterhouse, fed- sex with women and not other men.59 Dillon’s coworkers
eral courts disagreed about whether the statute prohibits dis- mocked him by suggesting that he took the submissive, stereocrimination against Ann Hopkins’s male counterpart: the effemi- typically “female” role in fellatio. Mary Ann Case, a professor
nate man.45 For male plaintiffs, a significant obstacle was the of law at the University of Chicago Law School, has suggested
tendency of courts to conflate impermissible sex stereotyping that the harassment of gay men for their receptive role in sexual
with sexual orientation discrimination, which courts have repeat- activity is a form of discrimination against the feminine, since it
edly held is not prohibited by Title VII.46 Put differently, when is based on the assumption that “real men . . . always tak[e] the
considering a “feminine” male employee, courts generally as- active/masculine role in bed and elsewhere.”60 Thus, the suborsumed that he faced discrimination because he was gay or per- dination of both gay men and women is closely linked.
ceived to be so, rather than finding that the employer had penalCourts may be more inclined to protect female victims
ized the plaintiff for not conforming to male stereotypes.
of sex stereotyping, like Ann Hopkins, than effeminate men beFor example, in Dillon v. Frank,47 plaintiff Ernest Dil- cause “masculine” qualities in a woman are typically far less
lon’s coworkers verbally abused him, calling him a “fag” and socially problematic than “feminine” behavior in a man.61 Furtaunting, “Dillon sucks dicks.”48 Graffiti at the work site de- thermore, male employees do not find themselves in a Hopkinsclared “Dillon sucks dicks” and “Dillon gives head.”49 After like bind because characteristics typically labeled as feminine
three years of harassment, Dillon quit his job and sued his for- are not as valued in the workplace as those characteristics
mer employer under Title VII.50 Dillon argued that his was a deemed masculine. Consider, for instance, a 2004 incident in
which California govercase of sex stereotyping, contending that he was
nor, Arnold Schwarharassed because he was not “macho” enough in his
zenegger, criticized his
coworkers’ eyes.51 While the Sixth Circuit acpolitical opponents by
knowledged that the harassment Dillon suffered
calling them “girlie
“was clearly sexual in nature,”52 the court held that
Dillon was subjected to a hostile work environment Discrimination against homosexual men.”62 Schwarzenegger
because his coworkers believed he was gay; theredid not mean to suggest
fore, their actions constituted sexual orientation men is grounded in stereotypes that that the lawmakers in
discrimination not prohibited by Title VII.53 The “real” men should date and have sex question were homosexual or effeminate; incourt found there was no evidence of sex stereotypwith women and not other men.
stead, he was accusing
ing and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
them of being weak or
Dillon’s lawsuit.54
ineffective. A spokesDillon offers an example of how federal
person for the governor
courts often treat male and female Title VII plaineven explained that the
tiffs differently. In cases of male-on-female sexual
term was “an effective
harassment, courts tend to take an “I-know-it-whenI-see it” approach.55 Had Dillon been a woman, he would have way to convey wimpiness.”63 Schwarzenegger’s statement imhad a quintessentially actionable sex discrimination case, and the plies that the only people who belong in positions of power are
court almost certainly would have come out in his favor. But “real” men, who are physically strong, macho, and aggressive.64
when it comes to male plaintiffs harassed by other men, courts The underlying assumption is that women – and men who are
set the bar much higher.56
too much like women – cannot perform effective work. Case
Why did the Dillon court get it wrong? First, the possi- has argued that this “disfavoring of characteristics gendered
bility that the plaintiff was a victim of sexual orientation dis- feminine may work to the systematic detriment of women and
crimination, as suggested by the “fag” epithet, obscured the sex thus should be analyzed as a form of sex discrimination.”65 Indiscrimination at work in the case. No evidence existed in the terpreting Title VII to protect men who “act like women” is thus
record indicating why Dillon’s coworkers believed he was gay; absolutely crucial to ending discrimination against women in the
presumably there was something about Dillon’s appearance or workplace. “If women [are] protected for being masculine but
mannerisms, as he argued, that his coworkers believed was not men [can] be penalized for being effeminate, this. . . would send
“macho” or “masculine” enough.57 The court’s second error a strong message of subordination to women, because it would
was its failure to distinguish between non-gender conforming mean that feminine qualities, which women are disproportionconduct and homosexual orientation. Dillon’s coworkers har- ately likely to display, may legitimately be devalued although
assed him by referring to sexual acts that Dillon allegedly per- masculine qualities may not.”66
formed with other men; the discrimination centered on Dillon’s
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit became one of the first
perceived conduct. The court, however, found that Dillon was courts to recognize that discrimination against a man who does
discriminated against because of his perceived homosexual not satisfy social expectations of masculinity is sex discriminastatus. This reasoning was problematic because even if Con- tion. The sixteen-year-old male plaintiff in Doe v. City of Bellegress amended Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi- ville67 was dubbed a “fag” and “queer” by his coworkers benation, effeminate men—both gay and straight—might remain cause he wore an earring.68 One coworker asked if the plaintiff
unprotected.58 That is, while it would be impermissible to fire a was a boy or a girl, called the plaintiff his “bitch,” and repeatgay man because of his homosexuality, it might be lawful to fire edly threatened to take him out into the woods and “get [him] up
the ass.”69 He also grabbed the plaintiff’s testicles to “find out if
him for being a man who acts too much like a woman.
This case helps illustrate that discrimination against [he was] a girl or a guy.”70
men who are gay, or perceived to be so, is a form of sex stereo84
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Fearing that he would be sexually assaulted, Doe quit his job
and sued his former employer for violating Title VII.
The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding
that the plaintiff could not show that he was harassed on the basis of sex because his coworkers were also heterosexual men.71
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that a straight
male plaintiff could not be sexually harassed in violation of Title
VII by another straight male. The appellate court pointed out
that if the plaintiff had been a woman and her breasts had been
grabbed, most courts would accept this as prima facie evidence
of sex discrimination. The motivation for the harassment is beyond the point, the court said: “When a male employee’s testicles are grabbed . . . the point is that he experiences that harassment as a man, not just as a worker.”72 It further reasoned:
“[i]f [the plaintiff] were a woman, no
court would have any difficulty construing
such abusive conduct as sexual harassment.
And if the harassment were triggered by that
woman’s decision to wear overalls and a flannel shirt to work, for example – something her
harassers might perceive to be masculine just
as they apparently believed [the plaintiff’s]
decision to wear an earring to be feminine –
the court would have all the confirmation that
it needed that the harassment indeed amounted
to discrimination on the basis of sex.”73
The circuit courts remained divided over whether samesex harassment was actionable under Title VII until the Supreme
Court answered in the affirmative in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.74 The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, was part of
an all-male crew on an offshore oil rig.75 He was apparently
targeted for being slender, longhaired, and wearing an earring.76
Oncale’s coworkers threatened to rape him, and one held Oncale
down while another pushed a bar of soap into his anus.77 Oncale
quit soon after the assault in the shower, scared that he would be
raped on the job.78
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fifth
Circuit’s decision that Oncale could not bring a Title VII claim
against his (male) harassers. Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia noted: “As some courts have observed, male-on-male
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII .
. . But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our law rather than the principle concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”79
Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that not all sexual
harassment violates Title VII. A plaintiff “must always prove
that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive
sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination . . .
because of . . . sex.”80 The Court held that when the harasser
and the victim are of the opposite sex, there is a reasonable inference that the harasser was acting ‘because of’ sex.81 A similar inference can be drawn when the harasser is homosexual and
the victim is of the same sex.82 When such an inference is not
available, however, a same-sex victim must offer evidence that
the harasser either treated men and women differently, or was
motivated by hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the
workplace.83
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Although Oncale acknowledged that men could sexually harass other men, the three evidentiary paths to a same-sex
Title VII claim that the Court laid out did not represent a significant broadening of the Court’s understanding of sex discrimination. Justice Scalia failed to cut through the gender dichotomy
and merely incorporated same-sex relations into the mix.84 Notably absent from his analysis was a discussion of male sex
stereotyping or non-gender-conforming behavior. In fact, the
opinion did not mention Oncale’s appearance, which might have
been insufficiently “masculine” for his coworkers and thus an
impetus for the discrimination. Justice Scalia did not even cite
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, which had been decided only nine years earlier. The concept of a man who wore
lipstick or walked and talked in an overly “feminine” way does
not seem to have crossed the Justices’ minds.

III. THE COURTS’ CONTINUING FAILURE TO PROTECT
NON-GENDER-CONFORMING MEN
Even after Price Waterhouse and Oncale, homosexual
and transgender Title VII plaintiffs continued to face an uphill
battle. In theory, under the mixed motives doctrine, if the evidence suggests that an employer’s decision was partly motivated
by sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination (both of
which are not prohibited by Title VII), a plaintiff is still protected by Title VII if he or she was also discriminated against for
non-gender-conforming behavior.85 Yet in reality, in the majority of cases where both sexual orientation discrimination and sex
discrimination occur, the existence of the former blinds courts to
the plaintiff’s cognizable Title VII claim.86
For example, in Bibby v. Coca-Cola,87 a coworker repeatedly called the male plaintiff a “sissy” and yelled,
“everybody knows you take it up the ass.”88 The court granted
summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s Title VII
action, finding that the plaintiff, who was gay, was harassed
because of his sexual orientation and not because of sex (that is,
his failure to adhere to gender norms).89 The court overlooked
the fact that “sissy” is an insult reserved for boys and men who
are not perceived as sufficiently masculine.90 A New York district court similarly disposed of a gay male plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims in Martin v. Department of Correctional Services.91 The plaintiff’s coworkers left sexually explicit photos in
his work area and drew sexually explicit graffiti on the restroom
walls, yard booths, and the plaintiff’s time card and interoffice
mail.92 They also harassed him with derogatory language, like
“cocksucker” and “fucking faggot.”93 But because the court
found no evidence that Martin acted in an effeminate manner,94
it granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.95 It
ruled that in order to ensure that plaintiffs do not bootstrap sexual orientation claims under Title VII, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that he does not, or at the very least is not perceived to, act
masculine”96 in order to make out an actionable case of sex discrimination.
While not all gay men are effeminate, and not all
straight men are “macho,” Martin illuminates the troubling necessity for a homosexual plaintiff to emphasize his “femininity”
in his complaint in order to convince the court that sex discrimination, not sexual orientation discrimination, was the root of his
harassment. As one commentator has put it: “[E]ntitlement to
Title VII protection ultimately depends on spurious factors such
as whether the particular words and actions used by harassers
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are sufficiently ‘sexual,’ whether the victim is an ‘effeminate’ or
‘masculine’ homosexual, and whether the victim pleads his
claim in language sanctioned by the courts that downplays or
does not mention if the plaintiff is gay.”97 Under this jurisprudence, Title VII will protect the stereotypically effeminate gay
man, but not the gay man who “acts straight,” or passes as
stereotypically masculine. This also presents a problem for the
male plaintiff who is deemed to be too feminine by his coworkers, but not quite feminine enough for the court to find that he
was a victim of sex stereotyping.
Heterosexual men who are perceived as gay have also
had difficulty establishing Title VII claims. For example, in
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,98 coworkers called
Michael Hamm, a straight male, a “faggot” and a “Girl Scout.”99
There were rumors that Hamm had a relationship with another
male employee, and coworkers often asked him whether he had
a girlfriend and why he was not married.100 After Hamm complained of sexual harassment, he was fired. Hamm then sued his
former employer under Title VII. Concluding that the term
“Girl Scout” was unrelated to gender, the court found that
Hamm was not a victim of sex discrimination; rather, he was
harassed because of his perceived homosexuality.
In this case, the gender nonconformity suggested by the
term “Girl Scout” was hidden behind the “faggot” epithet.
Hamm suggested to the court that “when a heterosexual male is
harassed and the basis offered for the harassment is ‘perceived
homosexuality,’ then it is likely and reasonable to infer that gender stereotyping is present and is the real basis for the harassment.”101 The court rejected this argument, insisting that “courts
have never focused on the sexuality of the parties involved when
determining whether sexual harassment occurred.” Hamm offers another example of how courts fail to distinguish conduct
and status. Ironically, the court defined Hamm’s heterosexual
status as irrelevant and at the same time made his status as a
perceived homosexual determinative.
Hamm also illustrates that discrimination based on sexual orientation, or perceived homosexuality, is in itself a form of
sex discrimination. Social norms prescribe that men should be
sexually attracted only to women, should date only women, and
ultimately should marry women. “It is essential to the maintenance of heterosexism that these two genders are interpreted as .
. . being ‘naturally’ attracted to one another.”102 Deviation from
this pattern of normative behavior arouses suspicion. Hamm’s
coworkers discriminated against Hamm because he was unmarried and may not have had a girlfriend. This case is an example of how courts have declined “to recognize that sanctions
levied on individuals for behaving or presenting themselves in a
fashion commonly associated with homosexual orientation or
transgender status are themselves a function of community disapproval of the plaintiff’s refusal or failure to adhere to gendered notions about appearance, attire, as well as sexual and
nonsexual behavior.”103
In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.,104 the court held
that an employer had not engaged in sex discrimination when it
fired the male plaintiff for presenting himself as a woman outside of work. In his off time, Peter Oiler, a truck driver for
Winn-Dixie, occasionally adopted a female name, Donna, and
wore makeup, skirts, nail polish, a bra, and silicone prostheses to
enlarge his breasts.105 After the president of Winn-Dixie learned
that Oiler sometimes appeared in public as Donna, Oiler was
fired.106 At trial, Oiler’s supervisor testified that crossdressing
was “unacceptable” in the area where Oiler worked, indicating
86

there was “a large customer base there that have various beliefs,
be it religion or a morality or family values or people that just
don’t want to associate with that type of behavior . . .”107
Winn-Dixie contended that Oiler had not been terminated for refusing to adhere to masculine stereotypes, but instead
because he was a man who publicly pretended to be a woman.108
The district court accepted this distinction and agreed that Oiler
was not a victim of sex discrimination. The court distinguished
the case from Price Waterhouse, maintaining that “the plaintiff
[in Price Waterhouse] may not have behaved as the partners
thought a woman should behave, but she never pretended to be a
man [n]or adopted a masculine persona.”109
Oiler is yet another example of the courts’ insistence on
maintaining a gender dichotomy. In Oiler’s own words: “[T]oo
many people don't see the middle ground between black and
white. And that's where people in my situation really are. People
hadn't even heard the word transgender. There are a whole
bunch of people in the middle.”110 So long as courts refuse to
recognize that gender identity discrimination and sex discrimination are parts of the same whole, individuals like Oiler, who
identify as male, but also want to express female parts of their
identity, will remain vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace.

IV. RECENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
There is some reason for optimism, however. Several
non-gender-conforming plaintiffs have recently succeeded on
sex discrimination claims. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., plaintiff Antonio Sanchez alleged that he was
verbally harassed for not adhering to social demands of masculinity.111 Coworkers used feminine pronouns to refer to Sanchez
and mocked him for walking and carrying his serving tray “like
a woman.”112 The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence that other
employees referred to Sanchez using female gender pronouns
and taunted him for behaving like a woman amounted to actionable gender stereotyping.
In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., Medina Rene, an
openly gay man, worked as part of an all-male butler staff.113
Rene was constantly harassed by his coworkers, who called him
“sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking female whore.”114 They
told crude jokes, gave him sexually oriented ‘gifts,’ and forced
him to look at pornography.115 Rene was also repeatedly sexually assaulted; his coworkers touched him “like they would to a
woman,” grabbed his crotch, and poked their fingers in his
anus.116
The district court dismissed Rene’s Title VII suit, finding that Rene was targeted because he was gay,117 but the Ninth
Circuit reversed. The appellate court found that since the assaults targeted sexual body parts, Rene had been harassed
“because . . . of sex,”118 and whatever else may have motivated
the attacks was of no legal consequence. The court cited Oncale, noting that the plaintiff “did not need to show that he was
treated worse than members of the opposite sex. It was enough
to show that he suffered discrimination in comparison to other
men.”119 However, the court’s decision in favor of Rene relied
heavily on the severity of the offensive sexual contact; had Rene
not been sexually assaulted, or had the touching been less egregious, the court may not have ruled in his favor.120
Although the majority ignored the fact that Rene’s coworkers called Rene “sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking female whore,” and missed the logical conclusion that Rene was
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on-duty, and as a woman while off-duty. He had a French manicure, arched eyebrows, and occasionally came to work wearing
makeup.133 After Barnes was promoted to sergeant,134 he was
the only sergeant subjected to extra supervision during the probationary period.135 Rumors circulated through the police department that Barnes was either homosexual or bisexual.136 One
of Barnes’ supervisors told him that he did not appear to be
“masculine” and needed to stop wearing makeup.137 Another
supervisor told Barnes that he was going to fail probation because he was not “acting masculine enough.”138 Although his
scores were above the minimum for passing, and even higher
than at least one other sergeant who passed the probationary
period, Barnes failed.139 According to several other officers,
Barnes lacked “command presence” and did not have the respect
of his subordinates.140 Barnes was the only person to fail probation between 1993 and 2000.141
At trial, Barnes successfully claimed that his demotion
from sergeant violated Title VII, and the jury found in his favor.142 Barnes argued that he was discriminated against because
he failed to conform to sex stereotypes.143 The Sixth Circuit
upheld the judgment on appeal, holding that Barnes had produced evidence sufficient to support his claim of sex discrimination. The court relied on the comments made by his superior
officers and noted that Barnes was singled out for intense scrutiny. It also found that Barnes’s “ambiguous sexuality” and his
practice of dressing as a woman outside of work were wellknown within the CPD.144
One of the most recent cases involving a transgender
plaintiff was Schroer v. Billington.145 Diane Schroer was born a
biological male. Before she legally changed her name or began
“[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who
presenting herself as a woman, she applied for job at the Library
discriminates against women because, for inof Congress. She interviewed as “David,” her legal name at the
stance, they do not wear dresses or makeup is
time, and wore traditional male clothing. After she was hired,
engaging in sex discrimination because the
Schroer told the interviewer that she was transgender, would be
discrimination would not occur but for the
transitioning from male to female, and would begin work as
victim’s sex. It follows that employers who
Diane. The next day, Schroer was informed that she was “not a
discriminate against men because they do
good fit,” and the job offer was retracted. Schroer then brought
wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
a Title VII suit against the Library of Congress.146
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimiThe court granted summary judgment in favor of
nation, because the discrimination
Schroer, finding that she was a
would not occur but for the victim’s
victim of sex discrimination.
sex.”129
District Judge James Robertson
that the Library may
Sex stereotyping based on a person’s observed
have perceived Schroer as “an
Smith alleged that his conduct and mannerisms did not conform to his employers’ and non-gender conforming behavior is insufficiently masculine man,
coworkers’ ideas of how a man should look impermissible discrimination, irre- an insufficiently feminine
woman, or an inherently nonand behave.130 The court agreed that if this
were the basis for his termination, Smith had spective of the cause of that behav- gender-conforming individual”
an actionable sex discrimination claim: ior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is and that each of the three
amounted to impermissible sex
“Discrimination against a plaintiff who is a
not fatal to a sex discrimination
stereotyping.147 The court also
transsexual – and therefore fails to act and/or
claim . . . ”
identify with his or her gender – is no differagreed with Schroer’s argument
ent from the discrimination directed against
that “because gender identity is
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in
a component of sex, discriminasex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a
tion on the basis of gender idenwoman. Sex stereotyping based on a person’s non-gender con- tity is sex discrimination.”148 It determined that the Library had
forming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective violated Title VII’s plain language prohibiting discrimination
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is “because of . . . sex” when it revoked its offer upon learning
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim . . . ”131
that Schroer, a biological male, intended to become “legally,
In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,132 the plaintiff, Philecea culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane.”149 The court
Barnes, had been an officer in the Cincinnati Police Department noted, critically, that other courts “have allowed their focus on
for seventeen years. Barnes presented himself as a man while the label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory language

targeted because his coworkers did not find him to be masculine
enough, three concurring judges found that this was a case of
actionable gender stereotyping.121 Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson pointed to the evidence that Rene’s coworkers touched him
and spoke to him “like a woman.”122 “There would be no reason
for Rene’s coworkers to whistle at Rene ‘like a woman,’ unless
they perceived him to be not enough like a man and too much
like a woman,” Pregerson wrote.123 “This is gender stereotyping, and that is what Rene meant when he said he was discriminated against because he was openly gay.”124 Thus, some judges
are beginning to understand that men who are harassed for being
gay are targeted because they do not conform to their coworkers'
expectations of what a ‘real man’ is like, and that this is sex discrimination.
In two recent cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against individuals who do not present themselves as members of the gender
they were assigned on the basis of biological sex. In Smith v.
City of Salem,125 plaintiff Jimmie Smith was a lieutenant in the
City Fire Department. When Smith started “expressing a more
feminine appearance” at work, his coworkers commented on
Smith’s appearance and told him that he was not acting
“masculine enough.”126 After Smith informed his supervisor
that he intended to transition into living as a woman, the department planned to fire Smith.127
The district court dismissed Smith’s sex discrimination
claim, ruling that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
against transgender people.128 The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that:
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itself.”150
The Schroer decision indicates that federal courts are
beginning to acknowledge that discrimination based on sexual
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression are all forms
of sex discrimination. Individuals like Peter Oiler, Diane
Schroer, and Medina Rene experienced discrimination because
they did not conform to their employers’ expectations of masculinity. Demanding that a person behave or present himself or
herself in a certain way at work because of the gender that society assigned to that person based on his or her genitals is sex
discrimination. The Supreme Court has held already that sex
stereotyping violates Title VII; breaking down the sociallyconstructed gender dichotomy may go past the Court’s analysis
in Price Waterhouse, but it is the logical next step. Moreover,
analyzing Title VII claims would be far easier for courts if they
stopped trying to maintain a gender divide that has become increasingly non-credible.151

V. TITLE VII AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The remaining question is whether a broadened conception of sex discrimination conflicts with congressional intent.
Many courts have refused to extend Title VII’s protections to
homosexual or transsexual plaintiffs on the grounds that doing
so would contravene the purpose of Title VII. For instance, in
Ulane, the Seventh Circuit declared, “[t]he total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption clearly indicates that
Congress never considered nor intended this 1964 legislation to
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex. Had
Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”152
Courts and commentators who express this view ignore
the fact that the Supreme Court left the legislative history of
Title VII behind with Price Waterhouse. And in Oncale, where
the Court acknowledged that same-sex harassment is actionable
under Title VII, Justice Scalia – a strict textualist153 and one of
the most conservative Justices – wrote: “As some courts have
observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII. But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our law rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”154
In light of courts’ gradually broadening interpretation of Title
VII, their refusal to extend the statute’s protections to transgender and homosexual persons based on legislative history
seems disingenuous.
The court in Schroer v. Billington
agreed, stating, “[t]he decisions holding that Title VII only prohibits discrimination against men because they are men, and
discrimination against women because they are women, represent an elevation of ‘judge-supported legislative intent over clear
statutory text.’”155
Some commentators who oppose an expanded reading
of Title VII have pointed out that Congress has rejected proposals to amend Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination.156 They argue that this shows that Congress did not intend the statute to protect homosexual and transgender people. However, the Schroer Court expressly rejected
such an argument, stating that the Supreme Court has cautioned
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against using legislative history in this way:
Subsequent legislative history is a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier Congress. It is a particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a
prior statute when it concerns, as it does here,
a proposal that does not become law.
Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction,
including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change.157
The Schroer Court suggested that Congress may have rejected
the passage of bills that would amend Title VII to expressly prohibit gender identity discrimination because the statute already
forbids it. Thus, the legislative “non-history” of Title VII may
demonstrate that “some Members of Congress believe that the
Ulane court and others have interpreted ‘sex’ in an unduly narrow manner . . . and that the statute requires, not amendment, but
only correct interpretation.”158 Joel Friedman, a professor of law
at Tulane Law School, has argued that interpreting discrimination on the basis of “sex” to encompass sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination would not circumvent congressional intent.159 He points out that Congress often paints “in
broad remedial strokes,” leaving the work of interpretation up to
the courts.160
Moreover, the courts’ narrow interpretation of Title VII
frustrates the statute’s broad remedial purpose.161 By refusing to
protect gay men, lesbians, bisexual, and transgender people who
face discrimination because they do not conform to a binary
gender system, “courts perpetuate the very subordination that
Title VII was designed to eliminate.”162 Courts’ insistence on
maintaining a strict gender dichotomy reinforces the notion that
women and men “are” and “should be” a certain way. If employers are allowed to demand that men not act “like women,”
this sends a message to all people that being “feminine” is not a
very good way to be – reinforcing patriarchy in the workplace
and society as a whole. This result is antithetical to the statute’s
goal of “plac[ing] women on equal footing with men.”163

CONCLUSION
“[T]he world will not be safe for women in frilly pink
dresses . . . unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as
well.”164 The refusal of courts to recognize gender nonconformity discrimination as sex discrimination legitimizes social devaluation of the feminine. Instead of breaking down barriers in
the workplace, as Title VII was intended to do, courts are actually reinforcing stereotypes about men and women when they
allow employers to discriminate against non-gender-conforming
men. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court declared that
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”165 To
give proper effect to Title VII, courts must recognize sexual
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression discrimination as sex discrimination and interpret the statute so as to protect individuals no matter where they fall along the gender continuum.
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